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According to Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, it is virtually impossible to harm a person (or future generations) by an action prior to their existence, even where that action will lead to a person existing with some sort of harmed condition, as long as the person has a life worth living.​[1]​ This problem has arisen in a number of cases where our choices can affect the welfare of future generations, such as reproduction scenarios, legal wrongful life cases, and risky ‘predictable catastrophe’ policies.​[2]​ Put simply, harm claims cannot be sustained in such cases because one cannot compare the life of a person existing with the harmed condition to a life without the harmed condition. The reason is that in those possible worlds where the harmed condition did not arise the person with the harm claim would not exist. Although Parfit’s conclusion has struck many as undesirable or counter-intuitive, it has proved difficult to reject Parfit’s arguments while replacing them with an account that can plausibly explain how it is possible to be harmed in such cases. In this paper, I will argue that both elements are achievable.





The central argument for harm claims will be established for pre-conception harms in scenario (i) and then extended to scenario (ii). The aim in doing so is not simply to show that an account of harm can be grounded in an alternative metaphysical theory so that it is not subject to the Non-Identity Problem. It is also to justify why this approach should be taken as a plausible contender for the way we view harms in these cases by allaying concerns about the seeming permissiveness of this alternative account. Therefore, while recognising the view that our genetic origins are of central importance to modal claims about ways we might have been, I will argue that the use of counterpart theory does not give rise to implausible and counter-intuitive accounts of harm in these genetic selection scenarios. Considerations about ways we might have been can be strongly constrained in the scenarios so that, despite some seemingly radical conclusions, we are still preserving many of the desirable elements that link people with their genetic origins while providing sufficient scope to account for harms and to reject the Non-Identity Problem.  

2. Scenario (i):  Non-Identity arguments and pre-conception genetic selection

Scenario (i) involves the following sort of claim: suppose we are sufficiently advanced to allow very specific selection of genetic traits through pre-conception genetic selection.​[4]​ If we use this technique to either ‘select in’ certain traits that are often deemed genetic disorders, such as deafness, or we knowingly fail to prevent genetically transmitted harms by failing to employ this method if it is readily available, can we thereby be said to have harmed the resulting child that is born as a consequence of our choices? By adhering to Parfit’s Non-Identity argument (NI) one would be able to defend the selection of a whole range of genetic traits on the following grounds: 

(NI)	There can be no claims to anyone having been harmed by any genetic 
choices that are made pre-conception, so long as one has a life worth living, because any variation in one’s actual genetic origin would have resulted in an entirely different person being conceived.

In order to generate the Non-Identity Problem itself, Parfit adopts an essentialist view of our genetic origin whereby each of us has the necessary property that we originated from the very same genetic material that we actually originate from.  This is contained in Parfit’s identity condition for persons - the Time-Dependence Claim:

(TD)	If any particular person had not been conceived within a month 
of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed.(Parfit, 1984 p. 352). 

For Parfit, this condition is uncontroversial and metaphysically mainstream, because it’s based on a version of Kripke’s view of the necessity of origins: 

(OV): 	Necessarily, we are constituted out of the very same genetic materials 
(gametes) that we are in fact constituted from.​[5]​

The necessity of this condition means that in every possible world, only those individuals who have the exact same genetic origins as my actual genetic origins can be identified as being me. 

These two claims (TD and OV) together allow the construction of (NI) by giving us a necessary property of a person: that each individual grew from a particular pair of cells (an ovum and a spermatozoon) and that if no child had been conceived by these parents in that time, then that individual wouldn’t have existed. 

Claims to pre-conception genetic harms are thereby avoided under (NI) on the grounds that any alternative selection of genetic material would have resulted in a different person. Had different gametes been selected in such a way as to exclude the genetic disorder, the resulting zygote would not have developed into that person and that person wouldn’t have existed. Hence the specific child in question cannot have been harmed by the selective reproductive choices as, had the parents chosen otherwise, a different child would have been born. Any claims to having been harmed in this way therefore come down to a choice between existence with a genetic disorder and not existing at all. As such, pre-conception genetic choices cannot be deemed to harm the individual by making them ‘worse off than they otherwise would have been’, because the only alternative to that life is a state of non-existence. 

The upshot of Parfit’s arguments for Scenario (i) is that applications of (NI) can be used as a means of defending the deliberate selection of (or failure to screen out) a range of genetic traits that result in some form of genetic disorder. Attempts to capture a general moral intuition that some wrongful action has taken place in such a scenario have focused on a ‘non-person affecting’ principle, such as those offered by Parfit or Brock.​[6]​ However, this sort of solution directs the issue away from the ethical intuition that someone has been wronged by the reproductive choices, notably the child with the resulting disorder.

The sorts of ethical intuitions that run counter to the conclusions drawn by Parfit’s Non-Identity argument place a primacy on ‘Person-Affecting Principles’ such as (PP)​[7]​ 

(PP) 	An action can be wrong only if there exists some particular person who is worse off after that action than they would have been if some different action had been performed instead. 

This principle grounds some basic ethical intuitions about our duties concerning harm; most notably that harmful actions are assessed in terms of how they affect a person’s level of welfare. It leaves us with three options in answering the challenge presented by Non-Identity argument in scenarios (i) and (ii):

(a)	Accept (NI) by presupposing (OV), (TD) and (PP). This supports the claim that no one has been harmed and no wrong action has occurred. 
(b)	Accept (NI) by presupposing (OV) and (TD) but reject (PP) and endorse some non-person affecting principle. This supports the claim that although no particular person has been harmed there is an ‘impersonal’ harm through a reduction in the overall level of welfare. 
(c)	Reject (NI) by rejecting (OV) and (TD) through a counterpart-theoretic approach and accept (PP). This supports the claim that some one has been harmed in accord with (PP).

As it stands, (a) is the problem as identified by Parfit, (b) is the position that Parfit himself suggests we should adopt in relation to it and (c) is the position that I will argue for.​[8]​ In order to make my case, an understanding of how the ethical problem created by the Non-Identity argument is derived from an essentialist metaphysical claim about the necessity of our origins is required. These essentialist claims regarding the necessity of our origins and ways in which we might have been are grounded in the metaphysics of modality, characterized in terms of individuals existing across a specified range of possible worlds. 

The crucial point of contention when confronting the Non-Identity argument is how we identify the same individual across possible worlds in relation to the genetic properties that individual has. Adopting a form of Kripke’s Origin View (OV), as Parfit does, would mean that because I necessarily have my genetic origins, only those individuals inhabiting possible worlds that have the exact same genetic origins as my actual genetic origins can be identified as me and therefore represent ways I might possibly be. In terms of the modal claim made by Parfit’s argument, this means that in every possible world where a person exists, they have the same genetic origins.  (OV) is therefore a crucial premise for a Non-Identity argument in scenario (i) – any change in my genetic origins is impossible because, by definition, that particular genetic heritage is what identifies me both in the actual world and across all possible worlds. As such, there is no way of comparing my actual genetic heritage with alternative ways my origins might have been.​[9]​  

The intuitive importance we often place on our genetic origins has made Kripkean genetic essentialism very compelling. However, there are alternative accounts of modality that do not require identity across possible worlds to be determined so rigidly by actual genetic origins. Lewis’s Genuine Modal Realism is just such a theory, which, instead of strict genetic identity, relies on counterpart relations and similarity.​[10]​  On this account, it is someone’s counterparts – individuals inhabiting other possible worlds – that can be identified as possible ways they might be. The problem of determining the truth of claims about someone having genetic origins other than the ones they do have is settled in terms of their standing in objective similarity relations to counterparts that inhabit other possible worlds. This provides a different basis to the one that supports the Non-Identity Problem by allowing all the required modal claims to be made by reference to these counterparts. For example: 

(MC1)	It is necessarily the case that John is human/male/a child of Jack and Jill/etc. if and only if all of John’s counterparts are humans/male/a child of Jack and Jill/etc.​[11]​ 
(MC2)	It is possibly the case that John is deaf/blue-eyed/tall/etc. if and only if some counterpart of John is deaf/ blue-eyed/tall/etc.

This is crucially different from the Kripkean formulation of such modal claims forming the basis of Parfit’s arguments:

(MC1*) It is necessarily the case that John is human/male/a child of Jack and Jill/ etc. if and only if in all possible worlds where he exists John is human/male/a child of Jack and Jill/ etc. 
(MC2*) It is possibly the case that John is deaf/blue-eyed/tall/etc. if and only if in at least one possible world John is deaf/ blue-eyed/tall/ etc.

In (MC1*) and (MC2*), the genetic essentialism advocated by Kripke and Parfit allows us to ascertain the truth or falsity of the modal claims on the grounds that John is identified across all possible worlds in the same way – that his genetic properties are always identical to those in the actual world. As there will be no possible world where John has any alternative genetic heritage, there will be no world where he has any (conceptually determined) genetic characteristic different from the ones he does actually have, such as gender, eye colour, height and so forth.​[12]​ 

3. Counterparts vs. Genetic Essentialism

In order to motivate why we should accept any account of harm based on these claims, the challenge for the counterpart theorist is to justify how their theory also provides a reasonable alternative basis to the Kripke/Parfit position. The specific difficulty to be overcome is how one can determine the truth of these modal claims if counterparts are identified not by the strict identity of genetic origins but by a weaker similarity relation.​[13]​  In other words, there has to be a convincing answer as to what determines a suitable counterpart for John in (MC2) that doesn’t rely on genetic identity.

Lewis’s theory affords a response to this concern through appeal to a semantic principle that can be used to determine the truth of de re modal claims, such as (MC2).​[14]​ The basis of this principle is that when we use modal language to express claims of possibility, necessity and so forth, we are also creating a context in which it is to be understood.​[15]​ Use of such a context principle is, in itself, remarkably uncontentious because similar use of context is employed in our everyday discourse. For example, when a bartender tells me there is no more beer left, I take him to be using a restricted quantification - one that ranges over the bar rather than the whole world - which makes his claim true. In this regard, what holds in everyday discourse also holds for modal discourse; so that many aspects of context will determine the range of possible worlds – and hence counterparts – that we are interested in. 

In terms of a response to (NI), this means that we need to identify the appropriate contexts that will allow us to make sense of the modal claims involved in making claims about possible changes in our genetic heritage. As a result, the selection of counterparts is determined in the following way: 
‘In general, the counterparts of an individual, x, are those individuals that are similar to x in some relevant respects and to some relevant degree.’ (Divers 2007: 44) 
Once again, there is no departure from our everyday usage, with predications of similarity being employed as they are in common contexts, just as when we say, for example, ‘Bach’s music is like Handel’s’, ‘rugby is like football’, ‘Mandarin is like Cantonese’, ‘Leopards are like other big cats’, and so on. 

Suspicion naturally falls upon the use of such a seemingly permissive account of modality.​[16]​ The reluctance to accept such a position is, at least in part, based on the fear that we have abandoned any useful means of specifying individuals across possible worlds on the grounds that any possible entity could be one’s counterpart. However, the crucial element of the counterpart approach is how the context will constrain the kinds of similarities we are interested in to determine which possible individuals are our counterparts. So, even this theory does not allow us to state either generally or absolutely for any individual who or what are its counterparts, this does not mean that the truth of any modal claim can be justified in terms of tenuous links of similarity. 

Fears about extreme and outlandish claims about ways individuals might possible be once we depart from accounts of strict genetic identity can be allayed through appeal to some basis facts about this similarity relation. This is achieved because the theory is underpinned by a clear and principled metaphysical thesis - that de re modal facts are “facts of objective (non-modal) similarity” (Divers, 2007: 45). The context of any modal claim should therefore sufficiently determine which aspects of similarity are relevant to determining someone’s counterparts. This is crucial if counterpart theory is to provide any effective and believable response to the Non-Identity problem. The only challenge is in determining what aspects of similarity are relevant to any case because similarity tends to be a very broad and vague relation. 

In cases involving reproductive decision-making involving genetic constitution, it is possible to establish a context in such a way as to maintain certain genetic properties as necessary but others only as contingent. At a suggestion from Lewis (2003), we can maintain very specific counterparts for individuals by building in context-specification to their names.​[17]​ This allows us to take a proper name for a person, such as ‘John’, and introduce a contextually specific proper name, ‘John-qua-human being’. This means that only very specific counterparts will suffice when making claims about the ways in which we might have been with regard to our genetic constitution. Accordingly, we may claim that for any discussion of genetic selection material the following is a modal truth:

(MC3) It is necessarily the case that John-qua-human is of human genetic origin,
Whilst simultaneously denying the truth of:
(MC4) It is necessarily the case that John-qua-human possesses genetic property a, 
Where genetic property a is some variation of a human genetic property, such as deafness, eye colour and so on.

The basic metaphysical underpinnings are now in place to address the Non-Identity Problem and so make a case for an account of person-affecting pre-conception genetic harms. An appropriate context concerning human genetic properties can be made for determining suitable counterparts across possible worlds in this respect. Crucially, given the nature of the debate in terms of changes in our genetic heritage, this context does not have to be significantly different from the demands of the Origin View (OV) specified by Parfit. For example, the context can specify the relevant counterparts are those whose parents are the counterparts to their actual parents. This context can be restricted even further through smaller and smaller variations in genetic heritage so that the similarity is closer: same parents, same egg, same timing of conception, but sperm differing by some minor chromosome change, and so on. Hence the appropriate counterparts can be determined by an ever more precise specification of their similarity to the actual person in question. 

It is important to recognise that this use of counterparts does not render as trivially true all our claims about possible ways we might be. It is not the case that anything we want can act as a suitable counterpart just because there is some tenuous similarity. In order to provide an adequate alternative to genetic essentialism, all we require is to make reference to counterparts who are similar in all respects except for those relevant variations in genetic origin. The successful and appropriate selection of counterparts across possible worlds will then be made only from those counterparts who are similar in all respects to our actual selves except for the few restricted, relevant variations in genetic origin.​[18]​ 

This approach to retaining as much as possible of our actual genetic origins that we can allow for in a given context, whilst still denying a form of the essentialist position for the necessity of our origins (OV), I take to accord with the view that Mackie (2006) calls the “tenacity of origin thesis”:
	“It seems clearly correct that ‘match of origins’, in some sense, is a feature to which we often give considerable weight... However…the necessity of origins thesis does not, I think, survive careful scrutiny…I suggest that we have an alternative: the ‘tenacity of origin’ thesis…The most that it need maintain is that his having something similar to his actual origin in certain respects is a feature that is normally kept fixed in counterfactual speculations about him.”(2006: 116-117).
Removing the demand for necessity of origins does grant the metaphysical possibility that there will be some highly unusual contexts where our counterparts would themselves be unusual things with wildly different origins.​[19]​ Although the mention of such possibilities often gives rise to what Lewis called the ‘incredulous stare’ objection, where people find them simply too outlandish to contemplate, such circumstances would only arise were one to speak ‘unrestrictedly’. This is precisely what will not happen in the sorts of case relevant to the Non-Identity Problem, where the tenacity of origin thesis is embedded in the context of discussing the ways we might have been. This context demands that the similarity to actual origins should be as close as can be maintained whilst still allowing for the possibility of those genetic variations that are at the centre of the issue.

In determining what the relevant counterparts will be, we are therefore constrained by context and additionally guided by the tenacity of origins thesis. This allows the theory the level of plausibility for application to practical ethical concerns by retaining a good part of the intuitive appeal that links us to our genetic origins. Although a rejection of strict genetic essentialism opens the (distant) possibility that we might have been different in any way whatsoever, making such a rejection is also the only way that we are able to make sense of questions about the possibility of our being genetically different than we otherwise are. The price is we have to pay for being able to ask these questions is that we must keep close attention on context in order to determine how far we should deviate from our actual origins. In the case of pre-conceptual harms, such as scenario (i), this will restrict choice to include only those counterparts with the most minimal genetic differences that would have been achievable alternatives to the genetic constitution that was, actually, chosen and which would have resulted in a person who did not have the harmed condition. That aside, all other expectations would be for the counterparts to exist in a qualitatively indistinguishable possible world from the actual, including sameness of parents, environment, history, etc. In addressing (NI), this approach to selecting counterparts will form the next crucial step as the basis for making harm claims. 

4. Counterparts and Harm Claims

Adopting a counterpart theory is only the pre-requisite metaphysical foundation to escaping the Non-Identity Problem. In addition, a relevant account of harm that can be applied to the modal context is required. For scenario (i), in order to establish a prima facie harm claim, genetic disorders would firstly have to be established as a harmed condition. Such accounts are readily available in terms of biological functioning, such that a genetic disorder is one that prevents or inhibits our biological function within a certain species-typical range.​[20]​

Any account of disorder in terms of biological function also requires an additional normative element to be considered a harmed condition. It is this element involving some form of Person-Affecting Principle (PP) that was, crucially, unable to be established in Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. Such a principle can now be captured utilising a conception of harm that Feinberg (1984) calls ‘harm-to-interests’, where someone’s relative levels of welfare can be compared, either in actual or possible situations.​[21]​ 

The relevant harms in the pre-conception genetic selection case will be those where we can compare the actual level of welfare of individual A with the level of welfare that A would have had (by reference to counterparts across possible worlds) if person B had not selected genetic material in such a way as to bring about the resulting genetic disorder. This can be achieved by comparing one’s actual level of welfare, involving biological functioning below a species-typical range, with the level of welfare experienced by relevant counterparts without that genetic disorder.​[22]​ 

What this amounts to is, in order to make the prima facie claim that one has been pre-conceptually harmed through genetic selection choices in response to scenario (i), a series of jointly sufficient criteria (SC) such as the following are required:​[23]​

(SC):
(1) 	The individual making the harm claim has a harmed condition.
(2) 	This harmed condition was the result of an identity-affecting action (i.e. rather than post-conception injury);
(3) 	The actions that resulted in the harmed condition were the foreseen or intended result of the decision to perform that action;
(4)	There was a practicable alternative involving choosing a different action that would not have (foreseeably or intentionally) resulted in a harmed condition.
(5)	There is some possible world that is similar in all respects except that the
counterpart of the actual individual with the harmed condition does not 
possess the condition because an alternative course of action was chosen.

These criteria could then be specified for particular cases. In scenario (i), the case for pre-conception genetic selection would be: 

(SC*):
(1*) 	The individual making the harm claim has a genetic disorder (determined 
through best medical understanding of a genetic disorder, such as biological functioning).
(2*) 	This genetic disorder was the result of a congenital condition.
(3*) 	The genetic traits that resulted in the congenital genetic disorder were the 
foreseen or intended result of a deliberate selection of genetic material (the originating gametes).
(4*)	There was a practicable alternative involving choosing a different set of gametes that would not have (foreseeably or intentionally) resulted in a genetic disorder.
(5*)	There is some possible world that is similar in all respects except that the
counterpart of the actual individual with the genetic disorder does not 
possess the congenital condition because of an alternative selection of genetic material.

Criteria (1) and (2) create the harm context. Although in (SC*) this is for pre-conception genetic selection for a genetic disorder, this may be changed for other contexts, for example, the inclusion of some biologically disadvantageous trait or (more contentiously) a social property.​[24]​ Criterion (3) is designed to capture certain elements of culpability or the ‘moral wrongness’ of the act in question through it being foreseeable or intended. This can be interpreted broadly to include negligence whilst ruling out purely accidental or natural circumstances that result in the same condition. The intention is to rule out harm claims levelled for cases of pure chance, and only allow claims for negligent, reckless or deliberate selection. 

Criterion (4) creates an even stronger ethical demand on the harm claim – that genuine choice was an option. If there was no alternative action under the circumstances, then one cannot draw the comparison where the individual concerned would have been better off than they otherwise would have been. This is another example of context determining the acceptable range of possibilities in order to rule out modal claims based on possible worlds with superior technology and such like, so constraining the modal claims in criterion (5). 

Criterion (5) is the element of this account of harm that provides the vital alternative account of modality to overcome Non-Identity arguments by providing the foundations for assessing a person’s relative levels of welfare. As counterpart theory allows sense to be made of ways an individual might possibly have been in terms of their genetic heritage, this reference to counterparts provides the flexibility needed to overcome the genetic essentialism at the heart of the Non-Identity Problem.

This account means that we no longer have to measure quality of life against non-existence. Instead, the measuring of harms is done in terms of ways in which someone might have been, given the choices and options that were available in the pre-conception setting. The additional factors derived from (SC) need to be in place for a legitimate claim to genetic harms to be made in order to rule out unwanted harm claims from natural conception or where there was no chance to select or rectify genetic conditions. Prima facie harm claims therefore may only be made where there was deliberate choice to conceive a child that would knowingly result in a genetic disorder and where there was a practicable alternative. The Non-Identity argument is no longer applicable to scenario (i) because we now have a means of explaining the different possible ways any particular person, A, might have been genetically. Crucially, comparative levels of welfare can now be drawn between person A with the genetic disorder and A’s counterpart without the genetic disorder, allowing the claim that A’s welfare is comparatively lower than if A had been genetically different and not had that genetic disorder. 

5. Scenario (ii): Pre-Implantation Embryo Selection 

The account offered has so far only been applied to cases of pre-conception genetic selection choices. Additional questions remain regarding its applicability to post-conception cases, such as embryo selection. Such cases pose a different sort of metaphysical question about identity-affecting decisions that will test the suitability of the account of harms so far offered. 

Pre-implantation embryo selection can be used as a means of assisted reproduction, where there is a set of existing embryos, each of which could be selected for implantation and develop into a fully developed person. This kind of scenario places tension on the traditional use of the Non-Identity argument. As the Non-Identity argument revolves around comparing existence with a harmed condition against non-existence, it is not immediately obvious how or why there are identity-affecting concerns in this scenario given the embryos already exist. However, decisions surrounding selective implantation can still be considered identity-affecting in the sense that they determine who will exist in the future. I use the term ‘identity-affecting’ here to distinguish such decisions from those affecting what life will be like for a fixed future population or from choices which do not affect identity, such as whether to undertake foetal surgery, where identity-determining decisions have already been made.​[25]​ In these cases, there is no question of comparing existence with a harmed condition with non-existence. Instead, the harm is relative to the quality of life that the child has compared with the quality of life that very same child would have had if the harming action had not occurred. 

Where we have the option of pre-implantation selection for disability or other ‘harmed’ condition, embryos conceived in vitro can be screened for a range of genetic characteristics and conditions. In these situations, a set of embryos are created and screened but only one of which need be implanted. Each of these embryos could, in theory, be implanted in separate wombs and go on to develop into separate persons.​[26]​ Any selective choice between embryos under these circumstances will then be identity-affecting in the sense that we would be choosing between different potential future persons. This is what marks it out from the pre-conception case of genetic selection, given that the embryo selection and implantation process is a choice between already identifiable and distinct embryos, not just between different genetic materials. 

As such, the Non-Identity Problem still stands in one sense in the pre-implantation case: that if the selected embryo had not been chosen and developed into the person with the harmed condition, then they would not have existed.​[27]​ So the choice appears as being between the person existing with a disability or not existing at all. Accordingly, there is no room to generate a harm claim based on the selection decision for implantation. Provided the person who develops from the embryo has a life worth living, then failure to choose that particular embryo would have resulted in them never being born. Hence the Non-Identity Problem would result in the conclusion that they cannot have been harmed by that decision so long as they do, in fact, have a life worth living because the alternative is non-existence. Given the form of Non-Identity Problem generated from this scenario, it is reasonable to ask whether this sort of Parfitian arguments can be rejected using an appeal to counterpart relations in a way that is relevant to a person-affecting harm claim. 

One immediate challenge for scenario (ii) would be that the appeal to one’s counterparts could not work because the only alternative choices and actions that the parents could have made would be to have chosen a different actual embryo for implantation. As the embryos are already distinct individuals, there is no scope for a harm claim based on possible ways the child born with the disability might have been because there could only have been completely different persons chosen. The proponent of the Non-Identity Problem would therefore continue to hold that there is still no alternative except non-existence and hence no harm claim to be made. 

This response, however, fails to appreciate the scope of the counterpart claim and falls back into the lure of genetic essentialism. The relevant question regarding embryo implantation selection (EIS) in this scenario is the following:

(EIS)	Under embryo implantation conditions, could I make the claim that I might never have had the harmed condition given that this would have entailed selecting a different embryo?

This appears initially to be very restrictive. In the pre-conception case there were potentially millions of differences available in the selection of genetic material. In the embryo selection case, assuming there were six embryos created for the selection process, there are only five alternative choices of embryo. 

There are two ways in which it is possible to respond affirmatively to (EIS). One response is to take a step further back and make a modal claim as to how you might have had a different genetic make-up as the embryo that was ultimately selected, such that the arguments concerning pre-conception genetic selection are repeated. Hence the harm claim becomes one about the selection of pre-conception genetic material used in the creation of the embryos, not about the selection and implantation of the embryo itself. The problem with this approach is that (EIS) would be the relevant reproductive choice question in those cases where pre-conception genetic selection was not an option in the first place. As such, where there is no alternative choice to be made, one cannot hold the parents responsible for the selection of gametes used. To do so would be to run counter to criteria (3) and (4) given in (SC), which are required for levelling a harm claim. 

The second response to (EIS) would be to advance a claim about the counterparts of the chosen embryo itself with a view to specifying the appropriate context in which the modal claim is being made. In the initial pre-conception scenario (i), a case was made that I might have had a different genetic make-up than the one I do in fact have by appeal to my counterparts across possible worlds.  The context of these modal claims was restricted so that the sorts of counterparts that I could make reference to would be limited to those of the same parents, etc. with differences being only a minor chromosome change in the genetic material. The case of (EIS) proves to be similar to this first scenario, albeit with a broadening of context to determine the counterparts. However, the danger of broadening the context further is that it does give rise to the question of whether this could still count as an acceptable view of ways I might otherwise have been. I shall return to defend this case presently, once I have outlined how this broadening of context would be achieved. 

With (EIS), there are only five other embryos that could have been implanted as alternatives to the one actually implanted. These will determine the context of any counterpart claim. It seems that it only makes sense to talk of  ‘parents choosing otherwise’ in terms of one of these five other embryos, which in turn restricts counterpart relations in this context to those five embryos.​[28]​ But if these five other embryos could each have conceivably been implanted at the same time I was and grown into fully developed and distinct persons, how can they be suitable counterparts for me? The plausibility of this approach therefore hinges on how this sort of context constrains the choice of counterparts in a way that meets the expectations of those influenced by the tenacity of origins thesis. 

The difficulty in conceiving that one of the alternative embryos could also be my counterpart is strongly influenced by the appeal of genetic essentialism. By contrast, within counterpart theory it is entirely cogent that any of the embryos not selected could be my counterpart in some possible world. Similar cases are well recognised, such as whether I might have been one or other of a pair of twins or even someone else entirely.​[29]​  In all such cases, the context of the question we are interested in indicates the appropriate counterpart relations that, in turn, determine what counterparts are acceptably identifiable as ways I might have been. How this arises in the case at hand is precisely what separates this account of harms from mere metaphysical speculation. 

In scenario (ii), the possibility of my being one of the other embryos is represented in another possible world with five counterparts for me (those embryos not selected). The counterpart relation that makes these embryos possible de re representations of me is determined by various intrinsic and extrinsic qualitative similarities, including similar origins. The acceptability of identifying my counterparts as these other embryos is derived from a very basic modal fact about the embryos: anything that is actual is also a possible way of being. As each actual embryo automatically constitutes a possible way for someone to be, they are apt to be possible ways for me to be. Given the context of the modal claims being made here, the possible individuals – my counterparts in some possible world – just are these five embryos under the counterpart relation. As any property one of my counterparts may have is also a property I may possibly have, then the property of being embryo two, or three, or so on, instead of embryo one is a property I might have. 

Although applying Lewis’s theory to this scenario provides the theoretical scope to select these embryos as my counterparts, it is nevertheless reasonable to consider whether this still constitutes a plausible explanation of a way I might possibly be. Given the hold that the tenacity of origin thesis has on our intuitions, the fear is that such a claim would be far too permissive by allowing the claim that I could have been any one of these embryos. Does this approach take us a step too far so that we have lost too much of a grasp on our actual genetic origins to accept it as response to the practical problem posed by the Non-Identity Problem in this case?

Part of the lingering reluctance to endorse the counterpart view I take to arise from the unusual circumstances that establish the sorts of context used to restrict the selection of my counterparts in this scenario. To allow for any engagement other than a flat rejection to the question of what life will be like based on our embryo selection choices, we will need to be able to explain why those embryos are viable ways I might have been. To do this, it is important to reflect upon the nature of the embryos that are being considered as suitable counterparts in some possible world. Firstly, the scenario constrains the choice of counterparts to only five possibilities. It is not even granting the wider scope that any embryo my parents might have produced is a suitable counterpart. Secondly, in this scenario, the embryos two through six that were not implanted are similar to me in many relevant respects to a very high degree. One can expect the relevant counterpart relations to involve, for example, those whose parents are the counterparts to my actual parents. As same parentage is one of the most important expectations of any origins view, this aspect alone has massively limited the possibility for genetic variations from the actual. 

Not only is same parentage a contextual constraint, there are also additional factors of similarity to take into account such as the method of conception, as all potential counterparts would also have been created in vitro for embryo selection and implantation. One could make this aspect stronger still by demanding a narrow time frame within which the gametic material was supplied for the creation of these embryos. This would make the scenario closer to the seemingly more innocuous question of whether the timing of my conception might have been slightly different by involving different gametes. Finally, there would also be the contextual presumption that these counterparts would also be located only in those possible worlds that were qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual world except for the single difference concerning selection and implantation of a different embryo. 

If one accepts that a counterpart theory such as Lewis’s is a viable alternative account of modality to Kripke’s, then there is no doubt that we can talk in terms of my possibly being one of the other embryos. But there is also good reason even for those inclined towards the tenacity of origins thesis to accept this. The selection of these embryos as possible counterparts for me is strongly constrained and matches as much of the actual origins as the question provides scope for. The contextual constraints of the scenario require only that we consider five possible counterparts, each with very similar genetic origins including same parents and similar method of creation. Once we abandon full genetic essentialism, the acceptance of their suitability as ways I might possibly have been is not such a stretch as it may first appear. This broadening of position away from the strong genetic essentialist requirement can even be seen in the formulation of Parfit’s own condition of identity – his time dependency claim (TD) discussed in section 2, that  “If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed” (1984: 352). Even Kripke has intimated that the crucial element in identifying an individual across worlds is sameness of parents, where he claims: “What is harder to imagine is…being born to different parents.” (1980: 113).​[30]​ As the sort of variation in genetic origins that we get with the embryo selection case still retains sameness of parenthood and can plausibly restrict even the gametic material to a narrow time frame, these sorts of variation appear to be within the bounds of consideration produced by the tenacity of origins thesis.​[31]​

The modal account of harms (SC) used in the pre-conception case is transferable to the case of embryo selection, with only the context allowing changes to the relevant criteria. This would mean that the deliberate selection of an embryo with a harmed condition is grounds for a prima facie harm claim where the parents could have chosen an embryo without a harmed condition, just as with the deliberate selection of genetic material in the pre-conception case. The pre-implantation selection choice can be said to have harmed me because one can make comparative possible circumstances - there is some possible world in which there is a practicable alternative selection that could have been made that resulted in my counterpart not having that condition. As a comparison can be made to ways I might have been rather than against non-existence, the Non-Identity Problem is avoided. 

One can create more difficult scenarios in the pre-selection case, such as a situation where all the embryos created for implantation have harmed conditions. This kind of case is interesting because it tests some additional elements to the sufficient criteria (SC) for modal harm claims. The problem can be addressed in two ways. Firstly, if one wishes to stick rigidly enough to the context that allows only the un-implanted embryos to be one’s counterparts in some possible world, then such context will not allow that there will be a counterpart that does not posses a harmed condition. As such, no comparison can be made to ways I would have otherwise been – the context has determined that I would have to be born with a harmed condition. Of course, this does not mean that it was ethically permissible to implant one of those embryos, only that the modal harm claim derived from (SC) is inapplicable. 

Alternatively, one might take a second response and claim that given all of the embryos available for selection had harmed conditions; there was no practicable alternative except to select such an embryo, which criterion (4) of (SC) demands. As such, the choice to implant an embryo with a harmed condition was no more subject to a harm claim than that by an entirely natural and undetermined conception. 





By abandoning traditional accounts of strict genetic identity we may not be able to act with the impunity that the Non-Identity Problem seems to give us, as the potential for levelling harm claims would become part of our ethical theorising about our choices and actions concerning future generations. Any identity-affecting set of choices that were subject to the Non-Identity arguments offered by Parfit would be a candidate for re-interpretation using counterpart theory and hence allow the basis of some harm claim. 

There still remain numerous intricacies surrounding our ethical interpretation of various aspects of decision-making that the modal account of harms offered here does not explain, nor is it meant to. The account leaves substantial scope for discussion as to what might constitute a harmed or disabling condition. It also says nothing about what the moral justifications for deliberately selecting certain genetic traits might be that could outweigh the prima facie harm claim. 
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^1	  I am here assuming that there are certain conditions that are harmed conditions. However, I leave it as an open question as to which conditions these may be (see, e.g. Savulescu 2002). The question as to whether someone has a life worth living recognises that there might be people born with conditions so terrible that it would be preferable not to have come into existence at all. See Feinberg 1987: 158-9.
^2	  The central account is Parfit 1984. For a range of discussion see: Bayles 1976; Brock 1995; Hanser 1990; Velleman 2008; Woodward 1986.
^3	  Kripke 1980: 113-115.
^4	  This might range from futuristic selection of traits using gamete pairs to issues involving current technologies such as sperm sorting for sex selection. 
^5	  Kripke’s (1980: 111-116) argument for the necessity of origins view for persons requires that it is an essential property that we came from the very same sperm and egg that we in fact came from. This is a form of gametic essentialism, which requires not only the necessity of genetic origin but also the necessity of particular gametes carrying that genetic information. 
^6	  Parfit 1984: 378 and Brock 1995: 272-273, have a ‘non-person affecting’ principle, which accounts for the moral intuition that some wrongful action has taken place. The basis for this is the consequentialist concern that pre-conception choices may result in a reduction of the overall utility of society, but no harm has been done directly to the individual child born with the disorder.
^7	  As discussed in e.g. Benetar 2006; Feinberg 1987; Woodward 1986.
^8	  Given these options, one might wonder whether rejecting (OV) or rejecting (PP) is more counterintuitive. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine this, it is an interesting question in itself given that both seem to be intuitively appealing. My aim here, although engaging with the intuitive appeal of these positions, is the somewhat different task of arguing how one may reject (OV) and accept (PP) as a route to rejecting (NI) for certain scenarios. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention. 
^9	  Precisely why Kripke (1980: 114, fn. 56) settled on the essentiality of origin goes beyond the debate of human trans-world identity. See Cameron 2005 for a discussion of Kripke’s footnote.
^10	  The central account is Lewis 1986. The term ‘Genuine Modal Realism’ is from Divers 2002 to distinguish Lewis’s account of modality from the ‘Actualist Realism’ of e.g. van Inwagen 1986, Armstrong 1989 and Kripke 1980. I will avoid detailed discussion of the nature of possible worlds except as much as is necessary for an understanding of the Non-Identity Problem.
^11	  This list is far from exhaustive, given that e.g. in order to distinguish my own counterparts from those of my sibling (and even more problematically, my twin) a more comprehensive list of similarities will be needed (although, as we shall see, in some possible worlds the counterpart most similar to me might indeed be my sibling or my twin. See Lewis 1986: 231-2). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this concern when initially faced with the counterpart-theoretic claims of (MC1). 
^12	  These claims only apply to genetic properties derived from one’s conceptual origins. There will still be possible worlds where John exhibits alternative genetic properties as a result of post-conception factors such as mutation, medical procedures, injury etc. However, John can still be identified across all possible worlds through having identical genetic origins to his actual one. 
^13	  Although Parfit 1984: 353-4 was dismissive of using similarity as suitable for determining identity, Lewis’s theory provides a response to such concerns. 
^14	  ‘De re’ modality concerns claims about objects and individuals. 
^15	  The importance of this aspect of Lewis’s account is dealt with in detail in Divers 2007: 42-47.
^16	  See Mackie 2006, especially chapters 5 and 6 for a discussion of this concern. 
^17	  See also Divers 2007: 46-7.
^18	  This means of determining counterparts is much more specific than accounts of descriptive identity, such as Hare 1975, which was criticised by Bayles 1976: 299 as failing to ‘suffice to identify a nonexistent person.’
^19	  There will be cases where in certain worlds the closest thing to a human being will be e.g. a poached egg. However, such contexts would be way beyond the scope of practical ethical applications of the theory. See Lewis 1986: chs. 4.4 – 4.5.
^20	  This account of disorder has substantial support in the philosophy of medicine. See Boorse 1977 & 1997 and Reznek 1987. Other accounts may still be employed, such as a social account of disorders, by adjusting the reference to possible worlds and counterparts accordingly.
^21	  This account of harming can be categorised as a ‘comparison account’ in the taxonomy of the metaphysics of harms given by Hanser 2008. 
^22	  Additional concerns about harm claims being made in terms of failing to select excellent biological traits can be dealt with in terms of ‘species-typical’ ranges of biological functioning, where selection below this range can be considered a harm but non-selection above the range can only be considered a failure to benefit. For a discussion of this issue see AUTHOR.
^23	  These criteria are jointly sufficient for a prima facie harm claim to be made and, arguably, some at least are necessary, such as criterion (1). It is prima facie because there is substantial room for determining what may constitute appropriate elements or instances, e.g. what sort of condition is a harmed condition, or what instances constitute practicable alternatives. For a more detailed discussion of such criteria, see AUTHOR
^24	  It is an advantage of this account that it does not commit itself to determining which traits are suitable for harm claims, only that one may use different traits without being subject to the Non-Identity Problem. 
^25	 This is the same sense and use of ‘identity-affecting’ as found in Wilkinson 2010: 69. 
^26	  I am hereby assuming that embryos are only potential persons, where ‘persons’ are humans with the full moral status assigned to all members of that kind. There are positions that view that embryos are, from the moment of conception, developed persons in the moral sense. It is not my intention to argue this position. For discussion, see Finnis 1994.
^27	  The ‘non-existence’ here is used in a different sense than in the pre-conceptual case. Clearly, all of the embryos created in vitro exist, whereas no individual exists at all prior to the gamete selection. Hence, ‘existing’ here refers to post-implantation existence as a viable foetus. 
^28	  This discussion of counterpart theory as applied to pre-implantation embryo selection does not address another major concern separate from the issues of identity and harms: one of unfairness or ‘bad luck’ at not being one of the embryos chosen for implantation and development into a human being. The concern is that embryos created for selection have been created on a conditional and instrumental basis for the purpose of testing them for their desirable genetic characteristics. This is an important aspect of the debate on embryo selection, raising questions about the moral status of the embryo and the permissibility of selecting and discarding viable embryos for implantation. See Steinbock 1992 or Scott 2007 for a discussion of the ethical and legal implications of this practice. 
^29	  These cases are discussed in Lewis 1986: 231-2.
^30	  However, Kripke does elsewhere also assert the strong gametic essentialism associated with (OV).
^31	  Such views about constraining our choice of counterparts would certainly fall under the heading of what Mackie 2006: 166 calls “minimalist essentialism”, where although we get a broad spectrum of possible ways each of us might have been, there will be some categories to which we must belong and some which we do not. Certainly anything close to maintaining the tenacity of origins thesis, such as same parentage, would fall well within this classification. 
^32	  Thanks etc.
